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Introduction
Despite the frequent references to commitment in social psychologi-
cal literature, little seems to have been done in the analysis of its
various components. Kiesler and Sakamura (1966) defined commitment as
"a binding of the individual to behavioral acts," this binding being
inversely related to the amount of inducement offered to an individual
for performing an overt act. Moreover, commitment is said to be in-
creased when one increases: the number of acts performed by S (although
this relationship may not be linear); the degree of irrevocability of
the act; the importance of the act to S; expectancy of positive outcomes
associated with the act; and volition of S, manipulated either by in-
creasing the degree of perceived choice or decreasing the external press-
ure to perform the act. Some consequences of commitment have included
increased resistance to attacks on committed beliefs as in the above
study, harsh treatment of the misjudged other if committed to a negative
evaluation (Walster and Walster, et. al., 1966), and attitude change in
the direction of the dissonance arousing but committing act in forced-
compliance situations (e.g., Brehm, 1960). However, since studies in
general tend to use commitment as an explanation of results, rather than
viewing results as explanations of commitment, this construct retains its
dispositional qualities leaving one with a vague understanding of its
underlying characteristics.
Steiner (1970), in describing components of perceived freedom, has
hypothesized that the expected gain derived from achieving a selected
alternative is equal to the expected payoff of the goal once attained
2minus costs incurred during goal pursuit. In this formulation, expected
payoff is conceived to be a function of valence of desired outcome times
subjective probability. Valence is equated with the importance an indi-
vidual places upon achieving his goal; subjective probability is the per-
ceived likelihood of outcome achievement; and cost is the amount of
expenditure of prized resources necessary to achieve the desired ends.
A review of the literature suggests that this formulation is applicable
to the issue of commitment. For example, the manipulations of commit-
ment cited by Kiesler are easily translated into Steiner's language:
number of acts performed, act importance, and irrevocability can be re-
garded as determinants of incurred costs. Volition is synonymous with
decision freedom; the greater the number of possible alternatives to
pursue, the greater the individual's decision freedom. Commitment in
Kiesler f s research increases as inducement to perform an overt act de-
creases, since such a decrease leads to a concomitant decrease in S's
perceived obligation to choose the most profitable alternative. In
Steiner's language, such a manipulation of decreasing inducement tends
to equalize the expected gains associated with various alternatives, and
thus to increase decision freedom.
Continuing to use Steiner's concepts, we may assert that commitment
occurs when the individual has incurred heavy costs in the pursuit of an
alternative, those costs not being retrievable if he shifts to another
course of action. Commitment should also occur when the individual has
freely chosen to seek one goal rather than another, and especially so if
other people are believed to realize that he has freely chosen. Under
such circumstances shifting to another goal almost necessarily requires
an admission that one has exercised poor judgment in choosing the first.
In general, loss of face should be especially severe if others are aware
of the nature of the initial choice, although loss of face in this parti-
cular case may also be seen as a result of evaluation apprehension where
E plays the role of others (Rosenberg, 1965). Thus, both irretrievable
costs and loss of face constitute penalties which much be incurred if
one changes his course of action.
It seems probable than an individual who incurs heavy costs while
seeking an outcome will tend to experience loss of face if he changes
goals even though his initial decision may not have been freely made.
Following along the lines of self-perception theory (Bern, 1967), S's
willingness to incur costs implies to others, and perhaps to himself as
well, that he found the initially "chosen" alternative attractive. Thus
the greater the costs incurred in pursuit of an alternative (especially
if they are irretrievable costs), the less opportunity the individual has
to shift to a new alternative without seeming to have exercised bad
judgment. This line of reasoning suggests that the freedom with which
one's decision is made tends to become a less important determinant of
commitment after heavy costs have been incurred. (Some of the argument
developed in this paragraph parallels certain facets of dissonance
theory: severe initiation ceremonies make the group seem more attrac-
tive; once purchased, expensive items seem attractive, etc. However,
dissonance theorists tend to emphasize the enhancement of the goal,
whereas the present formulation stresses the losses that must be sus-
tained if the goal is repudiated.)
The present research manipulates decision freedom, level of incur-
red costs, and the retrievability of costs in a 2 x 2 x 2 design. High
levels of the first two variables, and a low level of the third, are
hypothesized to favor strong commitment. In addition to these main
effects, an interaction effect of decision freedom and level of incurred
costs is anticipated: decision freedom should favor commitment when
incurred costs are low but not when incurred costs are high. A three-
way interaction is also a strong possibility: the impact of decision
freedom should be most strongly muted when costs are both high and irre-
trievable. Commitment is defined as continuation in a costly course of
action after it becomes apparent that the action has little possibility
of success.
5Method
In an experiment supposedly concerned with information processing,
S was to guess the identity of either of two objects by asking E not more
than twenty relevant questions about the object's characteristics. E
always answered "yes" or "no" according to a prearranged schedule of
responses. The sequence of responses, as constant for all subjects as
possible, and designed to create the impression of good initial progress
at low costs, took the following form: yes, yes, yes, no, and yes, for
the first five questions, and yes, yes, no, no, no, for the next five.
All remaining questions were answered no. However, slight deviation
from the schedule by one or two answers was necessary for most subjects
in order to avoid giving unbelievable replies and to allay subject sus-
picion. S was led to believe that successful identification of either
object within the twenty question limit, would result in a reward, $3.00
for those in the high cost, and $2.50 for those in the low cost condi-
tions, minus total expenses. Cost included either 60 or 10 cents for the
first 5 questions (high and low cost respectively) plus ten cents more
for each question receiving a "no" answer thereafter. Thus, although
incurring different levels of costs, both groups began on the sixth
question with equal expected gains ($2.40). S was required to restrict
his first five questions to only one of the two objects but was allowed
to shift to the other object if he subsequently decided he was not
making progress toward identification of the first. It was expected that
the response sequence was so designed that such a realization would occur
Low and high retrievability of costs were achieved by allowing S to
6recoup none or all of his incurred costs, respectively, if he shifted to
the second object. Decision freedom was manipulated by either letting S
freely select which object to identify or by "randomly" assigning S to
one of the objects by a lottery which in reality was rigged so that S
always drew the object he perceived to be the easier to identify. The
major dependent variable was the number of questions asked about the
first object before shifting to the second. In order to get information
concerning subjective probability and net gain both before and after
shifting, £ was administered a questionnaire after every fifth question
and again after indicating a desire to switch to the second object
(Questionnaires A and B, respectively, in Appendix). Ss who did not
shift (n « 22) were administered Questionnaire B after the twentieth
question. It should be stressed that £ was not allowed to shift until
after the fifth question. However, immediate shifting thereafter was not
expected since S> was working on the object thought to be easier and was
receiving mostly "yeses." The experiment was ended and £ debriefed after
he filled out the post-shift questionnaire. £ was then paid $1.50 for
his services.
Subjects
A total of 106 paid volunteer subjects gleaned from the student
body at the University of Massachusetts at Amherst served in the experi-
ment. Of this number, 40 males and 40 females, equally distributed
among treatments, were included in the data, while 26 were discarded
because they were included in pretests, indicated awareness of the true
nature of the experiment, or incorrectly completed the questionnaires.
7Procedure
All Ss were run individually, each randomly assigned to one of
eight treatments with the restriction that equal numbers of males and
females be included in each cell of the design. After S was seated
across from E at a table on which was located a small pile of dimes, he
was told the following:
"Back in the 1940's there was a popular radio program called
'Twenty Questions. 1 Members of a panel were told that their host
was thinking of something that was animal, vegetable, or mineral.
Panelists attempted to identify that object by asking twenty ques-
tions that could be answered either yes or no. Sometimes the panel
was very successful, but on other occasions they seemed to get
bogged down in unproductive blind alleys, and listeners could see
that a rather simple change in the line of questioning would have
solved their problem.
This type of radio program is of interest to psychologists
because it reveals the steps people take in searching for informa-
tion, and how they infer new information from that which they
already possess. This study is concerned with exactly these pro-
cesses, so we are going to ask you to play a modified version of
the 'Twenty Questions' game.
In the radio version of the game, panelists couldn't stop ask-
ing questions until they had identified the object or used up their
quota of 20 questions. Consequently, if they happened to go up a
blind alley, they were doomed to failure. We are going to alter the
rules by asking you to identify either of two objects , instead of
just one. You will start off trying to identify one of these two
objects, but if you feel that your questions are not moving you
along toward the solution, you can shift to the other object and ask
your remaining questions about it instead.
High Initial Investment (high incurred costs) :
In order to provide an incentive, we are offering a reward.
You start off with a fund of $3.00. (E then slid three dollars
worth of dimes over to a location directly in front of S.) The
first five questions cost you a total of 60 cents, leaving $2.40.
If you do not succeed in identifying the object with five questions,
you may continue with the rest of your questions by either shifting
to the other object or staying with the one you started on. All
questions after the fifth question that get "no" answers will cost
you a dime apiece. Questions that get "yes" answers will cost
nothing.
8Noa-Retrievable costs :
Remember, you may shift to the other object at any time follow-ing the fifth question* Your total payoff for identifying either
object will be the original $3.00 minus the 60 cents for the first
5 questions and 10 cents for every additional "no 11 question you ask
about either object.
Retrievable costs :
If at any time after the fifth question you decide to shift to
the other object, any cost you have incurred on the first object will
be cancelled, and you will start asking your remaining questions
with your original fund intact. Your first five questions about the
second object will again cost 60 cents and all subsequent questions
that get "no" answers will cost 10 cents apiece. Consequently, your
total payoff will be the original $3.00 minus 60 cents for the first
5 questions about the object you identify, minus 10 cents more for
each "bo" question you ask about that object.
Low Initial Investment (low incurred costs):
In order to provide an incentive, we are offering a reward.
You start with a fund of $2.50. (E then slid $2.50 worth of dimes
over to S's side of the table.) The first five questions cost you
a total of 10 cents, leaving you $2.40. If you do not succeed in
identifying the object with five questions, you may continue on
with the rest of your questions by either shifting to the other
object or staying with the one you started on. All questions after
the fifth that get "no 11 answers will' cost you a dime apiece. Ques-
tions that get "yes" answers will cost you nothing.
Both Non-Retrievable and Retrievable costs :
(Follows as noted above under High Initial Investment save for
the replacement of the quantities $3.00 and 60 cents with $2.50 and
10 cents, respectively.)
The two objects which you may identify are both animal. In
addition, I will tell you the following facts about them.
Object A is :
Larger than a baseball
Multi-colored
Found many places
Object B is :
Smaller than a baseball
Usually one color
Found few places"
The necessity of having all Ss begin on what they perceived to be
the easier object presented a problem for those in the Low Decision
Freedom (i.e., "randomly 11 assigned) condition. In order to insure that
these ss were assigned the "easier
11 object without revealing their private
9preference to E and thereby committing themselves to that choice, the
following spiel concerning an anonymous poll of Ss 1 preferences was
introduced:
"Some people find one of these two objects easier to identify,
and it is to your advantage to be working on the one that is easier.
In an earlier study we found that ability to pick the one that is
easier is correlated with several measures of practical judgment.
In order to further study this relationship we need to know for sure
which object is the easier to identify.
High Decision Freedom :
Therefore, I will ask you to indicate on a slip of paper which
object you think is easier to identify. Of course, that object will
be the one about which you will ask your first five questions.
Low Decision Freedom :
Therefore, I will ask you to indicate on a secret ballot which
object you think is easier to identify. Of course, the object about
which you must ask your first five questions will be determined
randomly.
However, you can change from that one to the other later on,
according to the shifting rules we stated before. Study the in-
formation (E then handed J> a printed listing of the characteris-
tics of the two objects), and then just write down on this ballot
the letter fA f or the letter 'B 1 depending on which object you
think is easier to identify. Then fold the slip of paper and
throw it into this pile of previously marked ballots."
While S studied the information (for not more than three minutes),
and cast his vote, E was across the room attending to other test materi-
als on a table. This was done 1) to adapt S to E being across the room
and thereby reduce suspicion whenever E repeated this move later in the
experiment, and 2) to make the voting situation more secretive and there-
fore less committing.
In order to insure that S in the LDF condition drew what he per-
ceived as the easier object, it was necessary for E to sift through the
pile of ballots containing S f s vote, read that ballot, and then select
10
from two prestacked lottery boxes that which contained only S's choice,
all without detection. Thus, to divert S's attention away from E, a
"review test ,f (see Appendix) was administered to all Ss. After S voted,
E returned from across the room, and while collecting the ballots (all
of which, for the sake of identification, had been inconspicuously pre-
marked, save that used by S) stated the following:
"Now, to make sure that you clearly understand the directions,
I want to give you a little test regarding the experiment. Simply
answer the questions as best you can, and then we will proceed with
the experiment."
Low Decision Freedom
While S was occupied with the test, E casually returned to the mater-
ials table, found S/s ballot (the only one not premarked)
,
and returned
to S with the appropriate box. When S finished the test E pretended to
correct it, saying:
"OK, everything looks fine on the test.
.
.good.
. .we can start.
(If S made any errors, E repeated the appropriate directions to
rectify the misunderstanding.) Now, to determine which object you
will start to identify, I'm going to ask you to draw out a slip of
paper from this box. (S theft drew from the stacked box to learn
that he was to start on whichever he believed x*as easier.) So you
will start asking questions about
.
Remember that your first
five questions cost you cents. Any further questions for
which the answer is "no" cost you a dime apiece. If you correctly
identify the object you win $3.00 ($2.50) minus the cost of the first
five questions and any "no" questions thereafter.
Non-Retrievable costs :
You can shift from one object to the other any time after the
fifth question but your total costs will thai include 10 cents for
each additional f no f answer you receive plus the costs you have
already incurred on the first object.
Retrievable costs :
You can shift from one object to the other any time after the
fifth question, but if you shift, all previously incurred costs will
be cancelled. You will then start over with your original fund of
$3.00 ($2.50) minus the 60 (10) cents for the next five questions
plus the additional 10 cents for each 'no' answer you receive about
the second object.
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Remember, since you have only 20 questions to identify either
object A or B, it is to your advantage to ask logical questions.Therefore, phrase your questions carefully so that you do not
waste questions by asking the same thing twice. You may take
notes on this piece of paper if you like. (E then gave S a slip ofpaper and a pencil.) (This last block of instruction was" added both
to increase impact and to aid E in following his prearranged sched-
ule of responses more closely. Pretests shox*ed that some Ss,
either through accident or design, tended to use past answers as abasis for programming subsequent, somewhat repetitive questions,
thereby assuring unscheduled, free "yes" answers.)
High Decision Freedom :
While S was occupied with the test, E simply placed the ballots on
the materials table and returned to S empty-handed. When S finished the
test, E pretended to correct it, saying:
"OK, everything looks fine on the test.
. .good. . .we can start.
Now, with which object would you like to begin? (S then responded).
So, you will start asking questions about
.
Remember that
your first five questions ... (same as for LDF from this point on)."
After S_ had asked and E had answered the fifth question, E withdrew
the appropriate amount of dimes from S's pile and then added:
"Now, every so often, 1*11 ask you if you would like to shift
or continue, just as a sort of reminder to you that you do have
that option. However, bear in mind that from this point on, you
may shift any time you like
. Now, would you like to shift or con-
tinue?"
After indicating whether or not they wished to shift, all Ss, in-
cluding those who decided to shift at this point (n = 5), were adminis-
tered Questionnaire A. If continuation was desired and after completing
the questionnaire, S_ continued his questioning while E responded appro-
priately, mostly no's, so that little progress was made and costs contin-
ued to mount (as indicated by E pulling away more and more dimes from
S's pile). If S_ did not shift before asking the tenth question, question-
naire A was administered for a second time after the tenth question was
12
answered. Questionnaire A was repeated for a third and last time follow-
ing the 15th question if shifting did not occur before that point.
When S indicated a desire to shift, or when he used up his quota
of 20 questions on the first object, he received Questionnaire B. Fol-
lowing completion of this questionnaire, the experiment was terminated
and S was debriefed.
12
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When S indicated a desire to shift, or when he used up his quota
of 20 questions on the first object, he received Questionnaire B. Fol-
lowing completion of this questionnaire, the experiment was terminated
and S was debriefed.
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Analysis and Results
Number of Questions Asked Before Shifting
Table 1 presents cell means for the number of questions asked by S
before requesting to shift to the alternative object. Sex is treated as
an added factor. As nobody shifted after asking fifteen questions, all
Ss who had not shifted by the 15th question were given a score of twenty.
A four-way analysis of variance was performed on these data. As can be
seen in Table 2, only a main effect for cost, which was opposite to pre-
diction, and a four-way interaction, depicted in Figure 1, were signifi-
cant.
Insert Tables 1, 2, and Figure 1 about here
Subjects 1 Perception of the Situation: Manipulation Effects
Since predicted effects on the number of questions asked before
shifting were not obtained, it is particularly important to examine
how Ss perceived their situation and whether those perceptions varied
across manipulations and over time. Here we will report effects of the
manipulations on perceptions subjects held both after asking their first
five questions and when they indicated a desire to shift to the second
object or had used up their quota of twenty questions. Subsequent sec-
tions will then deal with changes in perception over time as well as
differences in perception among Ss who shifted at different points in
their questioning.
Subjects 1 ratings after the fifth question, A multivariate
14
TABLE 1
Mean Number of Questions
Asked Before Shifting
High Costs Low Costs
Hales Females Males Females
Retrievable
costs 12.20 13.00 14.40 14.60
High Decision
Freedom
Low Decision
Freedom
Nonretrievable
costs 11.60 11.20 15.20 8.80
Retrievable
costs 10.60 11.20 17.00 11.80
Nonre trievable
costs 13.40 10.00 14.40 18.20
Marginals
:
Males 13.600
Females 12.350
High Costs 11.650*
Low Costs 14.300
Retrievable 13.100
Nonretrievable 12.850
High Freedom 12.625
Low Freedom 13.325
*p < .05
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TABLE 2
Analysis of Variance For
The Number of Questions
Asked Before Shifting
SOURCE DF MS F
Sex (A)
Cost (B)
Retrievability (C)
Decision Freedom (D)
A X B
A
A
B
B
C
A
A
A
B
A
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
C
D
C
D
D
B
B
C
C
B
X
X
X
X
X
c
D
D
D
C X D
Error 64
31.250
140.450
1.250
9.800
8.450
2.450
.800
.050
39.200
51.200
18.050
20.000
51.200
7.200
105.800
23.231
1.345
6.046*
.054
.422
.364
.105
.034
.002
1.687
2.204
.777
.861
2.204
.310
4.554*
*p < .05
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Males
20
15
10
High
Freedom
.,
Nonret
.
Ret.
Low
Freedom
, Ret.
Nonret
Mean Number Of 5
Questions Asked
Before Shifting
I V- -
High Cost Low Cost High' Cost Low Cost
Females
20
15
10
Mean Number Of
Questions Asked
Before Shifting
High
Freedom
Ret.
Nonret
r
High Cost Low Cost
Low
Freedom
Nonret.
.Ret.
1 —J
High Cost Low Cost
Fig. 1. Mean number of questions asked
as a function of sex, cost,
retrievability, and decision freedom
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analysis of variance was run for all responses on the first administra-
tion of Questionnaire A, i.e., after S had asked his first five ques-
tions. All means are reported in the Appendix. Here we shall discuss
only the significant results. As can be seen in Table 3, after asking
their first five questions, males, Ss whose investments would be re-
trieved if they shifted, and those who had freely chosen the object
they were attempting to identify, tended to believe that they would win
significantly more money by shifting to the alternative object than did
females, Ss whose investments would not be returned, and those who were
randomly assigned an object, respectively.
Subtracting the amount of money Ss thought they would win if they
shifted to the second object from the expected gain associated with suc-
cessful identification of the first produced a difference score reflect-
ing the relative profit expected to result from sticking with the first
object. As Table 4 reveals, Ss in the Low Retrievable condition expected
to profit significantly more by staying with the first object than did
those in the Retrievable group.
A four -way interaction for the degree to which Ss felt that their
first five questions were logical was also found (See Table 5).
Insert Tables 3, 4, and 5 about here
Responses to Questionnaire B « It is to be recalled that Question-
naire B was administered to all Ss immediately after they had indicated
their desire to shift to the alternative object, or, in the case of
those who did not indicate such a desire, immediately after the twentieth
18
TABLE 3
Mean Amount of Money Expected To Win
If Shift To Alternative Object After
Asking First Five Questions
High Costs Low Costs
Males Females Males Females
Retrievable
costs $1.24 $1.70 $1.54 $ .90
High Decision
Freedom
Nonretrievable
Costs $1.28 $1.05 $1.32 $1.04
Retrievable
costs $1.30 $1.00 $1.36 $1.20
Low Decision
Freedom
Nonre trievab le
costs $ .98 $ .62 $1.12 $ .44
Marginals:
Males $1.27*
Females .99
High Costs $1.15
Low Costs 1.12
Retrievable $1.28*
Nonretrievable .98
High Freedom $1.26*
Low Freedom 1.00
*p < .05
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TABLE 4
Meaa Profit Expected To Be Made
By Sticking With First Object
After Asking First Five Questions
High Costs Low Costs
Males Females Males Females
Retrievable
costs $ .00 $ .18 $ .14 $ .14
High Decision
Freedom
Nonre tr ievab 1
e
costs $ .39 $ .48 $ .26 $ .28
Retrievable
costs $ .24 $ .06 $ .26 $ .06
Low Decision
Freedom
Nonretrievable
costs $ .58 $ .26 $ .56 $ .83
Marginals
:
Males $ .30
Females .29
High Cost $ .27
Low Cost $ .32
Retrievable $ .14*
Nonretrievable .46
High Freedom $ .23
Low Freedom .36
p < .01
20
TABLE 5
Mean Self-ratings For Degree of
Logic For First Five Questions
High Costs Low Costs
High Decision
Freedom
Males Females
Retrievable
costs 2.80 3.40
Males Females
4.20 3.60
Nonretrievable
costs 3.40 2.60 2.80 4.20
Low Decision
Freedom
Retrievable
costs 3.40 2.60 2.60 3.00
Nonretrievable
costs 1.40 3.40 3.60 3.40
Marginals
:
Males
Females
3.025
3.275
Higtp.Cost
Low Cost
2.875
3.425
Retrievable 3.200
Nonretrievable 3.100
High Freedom 3.375
Low Freedom 2.925
Note: The smaller the number, the greater the
degree of logic perceived.
question. Thus, responses to this questionnaire indicate Ss' percep-
tions of the situation that had developed by the time questioning was
terminated.
Questionnaire B included 5 two-alternative items designed to assess
the extent to which Ss acknowledged "loss of face" as a reason for not
having shifted earlier (See Appendix B) . Each item paired a statement
admitting loss of face with one citing a different reason for persisting
on the first object. Chi square analysis revealed that Ss who acknow-
ledge loss of face on one item tended also to acknowledge it on other
items (p values ranged from .001 to .05). In view of the inter-item
consistencies, a total loss-of-face score was computed by counting the
number of times (out of 5) S selected the loss-of-face alternative as the
one that more accurately represented his reasons for persisting with
object one. Means of these scores are reported separately for each
treatment group in Table 6.
Analysis of variance performed on loss-of-face scores revealed sig-
nificant main effects of sex (F 9.102, p < .01), costs (F m 4.302,
p < .05), and retrievability of costs (F = 9.102, p < .01). Females,
subjects in the Low Cost condition, and those whose costs were retriev-
able expressed more loss of face than did males, subjects in the High
Cost condition, and those whose costs were not retrievable. There was
also a significant interaction effect of cost and decision freedom.
Figure 2 indicates that costs had little effect when decision freedom
was high, but large effects when decision freedom was low.
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Insert Table 6 and Figure 2 about here
Table 7 reports the mean amounts of money subjects in each treat-
ment category expected to win by shifting to the second object. Analysi
of variance indicated that subjects for whom costs were retrievable ex-
pected to earn significantly more by shifting than did those for whom
costs were not retrievable (F « 10.632, p < .01). Other effects were
not significant.
Insert Table 7 about here
An interaction of cost and sex, as graphed in Figure 3, appeared
for money expected to be won upon successful identification of the first
object. Here differences between males and females are accentuated when
costs were low.
Insert Figure 3 about here
A score indicating the amount of net profit £ believed he stood to
gain by shifting was computed by subtracting the sum he estimated he
would earn by shifting to the second object from the amount he would
receive by persisting on the first. The means of these net profit
scores are reported in Table 8. Analysis of variance indicated that
subjects who had initially invested only ten cents expected a smaller
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TABLE 6
Mean Loss Of Face Scores
For Questionnaire B
High Costs Low Costs
Males Females Males Females
Retrievable
costs 2.60 2.80 1.80 3.00
High Decision
Freedom
Nonretrievable
costs .60 2.20 1.40 1.60
Retrievable
costs .80 2.20 3.00 3.60
Low Decision
Freedom
Nonretrievable
costs 1 .20 2.00 2.00 2.40
Marginals
:
Males 1.675**
Females 2 .475
High Costs 1.800*
Low Costs 2.350
Retrievable 2.475**
Nonretrievable 1 .675
High Freedom 2.000
Low Freedom 2.150
Note: the greater the number, the greater
the degree of loss of face expressed.
*p < .05
** p < .01
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Fig. 2. Mean loss of face scores plotted as a
function of decision freedom with
cost as a parameter.*
interaction significant at p < .05
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TABLE 7
Mean Expected Gain Associated With Successful
Identification of Second Object
(Questionnaire B)
High Costs Low Costs
Males Females Males Females
Retrievable
costs $1.44 $1.26 $1.64 $1.04
High Decision
Freedom
Low Decision
Freedom
Nonretrievable
costs $1.12 $ .76 $1.06 $1.04
Retrievable
costs $1.66 $1.10 $ .84 $1.30
Nonretrievable
costs $ .88 $ .66 $ .86 $ .44
Marginals
:
Males
Females
$1.19
.95
High Costs
Low Costs
1.11
1.03
Retrievable
Nonretrievable
1.29
.85
High Freedom
Low Freedom
1.17
.97
p < .01
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Fig. 3. Mean post-shift expected gain associated with
eventual identification of first object plotted as
a function of cost with sex as a parameter.*
interaction significant at p < .05
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profit (greater loss) from shifting than did subjects who initially in-
vested 60 cents (F « 4.069, p < .05), and those in the Retrievable Costs
condition tended to expect a greater profit than their Nonretrievable
Costs counterparts (F 5.302, p < .05). Moreover, a significant sex by
cost interaction was obtained, indicating that the differences between
the two sexes was accentuated when costs were high. Figure 4 reports
this interaction. (However, since a significant sex by cost interaction
was found on expected winnings associated with the first object in the
absence of a significant sex by cost interaction on that associated with
the second, the profit calculation amounted to the simple subtraction of
a constant from those values graphed in Figure 3 thereby producing these
essentially redundant data.)
Insert Table 8 and Figure 4 about here
Lastly, with respect to the degree to which Ss perceived their ques-
tions to be logical, a main effect for retrievability was discovered.
As is pointed out in Table 9, Nonretrievable Ss characterized their ques-
tions as more logical than did Retrievable Ss (F » 5.173, p < .05).
The three-way interaction of Figure 5 for sex, retrievability, and de-
cision freedom was also significant: whereas low freedom separated
retrievable from nonretrievable male subjects, it was high freedom that
separated the two retrievable groups of females. An interaction involv-
ing all four factors was significant and is graphed in Figure 6.
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TABLE 8
Mean Profit Expected In Shifting To Second
Object Rather Than Continuing On With The First
(Questionnaire B)
High Costs low Costs
Males Females Males Females
Retrievable $-.86 $-.26 $-.60 $-.40
costs
High Decision
Freedom
Nonretrievable
costs $-.50 $+.04 $-.08 $-.26
Retrievable
costs $-1.32 $-.22 $+.30 $-.54
Low Decis ion
Freedom
Nonretrievable
costs $-.34 $-.28 $+.04 $+.06
Marginals
:
Males $-.42
Females -.23
High Costs -.47*
Low Costs -.19
Retrievable -.49*
Nonretrievable -•17
High Freedom -.37
Low Freedom -.29
Note: the more negative the number, the
greater the profit expected in
shifting to the second object.
*p < .05
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to second object plotted as a function of
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Interaction significant at p < .01
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Insert Table 9 and Figures 5 and 6 about here
Perceptual Differences Between Differentially Shifting Subjects
Analysis of subjects' perceptions thus far has been concerned with
manipulation effects on responses to the first administration of
Questionnaire A and the post-shift instrument, Questionnaire B. How-
ever, further insight may be gained by grouping Ss into three "shifting"
classes, based upon the number of questions each S asked before "shifting.
Such a grouping procedure enables one to determine: the degree to which
the cognitive maps of subjects tend to differ as a function of shifting
early, late, or not at all; whether a significant change occurs in the
average subject's cognitive map as he moves from his fifth question to a
point where he decides to shift (or pose his twentieth question); and
whether the rate of such change differs for subjects in different shift-
ing classes. Such an analysis also allows for comparisons (where possi-
ble) between average perceptions of differentially shifting subjects at
successive points in time (as indexed by responses to each administration
of the questionnaires). These analyses and their results follow.
Changes in perceptions over time . All Ss were divided into three
"shifting" classes: those who shifted after asking five to ten questions,
inclusive (shifting class 1, or SC 1); those who shifted after asking
eleven to fifteen questions (SC 2); and those who asked the full twenty,
i.e., did not shift to the alternative object at any point in their
questioning (SC 3). Main effects for shifting class (SC) , and time (T)
,
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TABLE 9
Mean Degree To Which Questions Were Perceived
To Be Logical
(Questionnaire B)
High Costs low Costs
Males Females Males Females
Retrievable
costs 3.60 4.80 4.00 3.80
High Decision
Freedom
Nonretrievable
costs 3.40 2.40 3.80 3.60
Retrievable
costs 5.40 3.80 3.80 5.00
Low Decision
Freedom
Nonretrievable
costs 2.20 4.40 3.40 4.40
Marginals:
Males 3.700
Females 4.025
High Costs 3.750
Low Costs 3.975
Retrievable 4.275*
Nonretrievable 3.450
High Freedom 3.675
Low Freedom 4.050
Note: the smaller the number, the greater the degree
of logic perceived.
*p < .05
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as well as a SC X T interaction were tested by running a 3 X 2 analysis
of variance (3 SC groups; two points in time, Questionnaires A and B)
on five dependent measures in order to discover whether Ss who shifted
early, late, or not at all differed in their perceptions of the situa-
tion; whether any perceptual changes occurred over the course of
questioning; and whether shifting at different points was accompanied by
different rates in those changes. Shifting class and time were treated
as between- and within- subject variables, respectively. The five
dependent variables, plotted separately for each class in Figures 7
through 11, were: subjective probability of, and the expected gain
associated with, successful identification of the first object; gain
expected as a result of shifting to the second object rather than contin-
uing on with the first; expected profit associated with sticking with the
first object rather than shifting; and the degree to which Ss thought
their questions to be logical.
For all five dependent measures, only a main effect for time was
found (p < .001); neither the main effects for shifting class nor the
two-way interaction were significant. Inspection of Tables 10 through 14
indicates that subjects in all three shifting classes tended to manifest
the same cognitive changes as they proceeded through the questioning
period. Thus, regardless of whether subjects shifted almost immediately
after responding to Questionnaire Al or did not shift at all (asked 15
more questions without shifting), subjects manifested the same changes
between Questionnaire Al and Questionnaire B. They became less confident
that they would identify object one (Table 10), expected to win less
money by identifying either object one (Table 11) or object two (Table 12),
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Insert Tables 10-14 about here
anticipated that less profit would accrue by continuing to focus on
object one rather than shifting (Table 13), and felt that their questions
were less logical (Table 14).
The fact that time (Questionnaire Al vs. Questionnaire B) did not
interact with shift group may be interpreted to mean that there were no
significant differences between groups in either amount or direction of
change. Thus some subjects (SCI) changed as much by asking a very few
questions as did other subjects (SC2 or SC3) by asking many questions.
But all three groups of subjects changed in essentially the same ways.
Differences between the perceptions of shifting classes
. The pre-
viously reported failure to obtain a significant main effect of shifting
classes makes further comparisons of those groups somewhat dubious. How-
ever, the previous analysis concerned only data from Questionnaire Al and
B, and said nothing about the possible differences between responses to
Questionnaires A2 and A3. This section concerns such differences and
also reports the results of further analysis of differences between res-
ponses to Questionnaire Al and B. Needless to say, the latter analysis
must be regarded as exploratory rather than definitive. t tests are
employed to evaluate differences between pairs of mean scores.
Figure 7 depicts each shifting class's mean subjective probability
of successfully identifying the first object at each point in time. No
significant differences were found between any pair of shifting classes,
TABLE 10
Mean Subjective Probabilities That S Will
Successfully Identify First Object, With
Shifting Class and Time as Independent Variables
Time
Shifting Questionnaire Al Questionnaire B
Class
,
1
,
4.97 7.09
(5-10)
,
2 3.91 7.26
(11-15)
3 4.23 6.64
(20)
Marginals:
Al 4.37*
B 7.00
SC 1 6,03
SC 2 5.59
SC 3 5.^3
Note: The greater the number, the less the subjective
probability.
* p< .001
TABLE 11
Mean Amounts of Money Expected To Be Won
Upon Successful Identification of the First
Object, With Shifting Class and Time
As Independent Variables
Time
Shifting Questionnaire Al Questionnaire B
Class
uiA) 1,57 - 79
Marginals
:
Al $ 1.^3*
B .7*
SC 1 $ 1.07
SC 2 1.18
SC 3 1.01
p < .001
TABLE 12
Mean Amounts of Money Expected To Be Won
In Shifting To Second Object, With Shifting
Class and Time As Independent Variables
°
Time
Shifting Questionnaire Al Questionnaire B
Class
(5-io) *
1,18 *lim
(ll-l
2
5)
la5
Marginals:
Al $ 1.12*
B 1.04
SC 1 $ 1.19
SC 2 1.17
SC 3 .87
p < .001
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TABLE 13
Mean Amount of Profit Expected In Sticking
With the First Object Rather Than Shifting
To the Second Object, With Shifting Class
And Time As Independent Variables
Time
Shifting Questionnaire Al Questionnaire B
Class
1 % + .IV % - .44
(5-io)
2 + .3? - .36
(11-15)
3 + .38 - .11
(20)
Marginals
:
Al $ + .31*
B - .30
SC 1 % .13
SC 2 + .01
SC 3 + .13
Note: A positive number reflects the profit expected in
sticking, while a negative number reflects expected loss.
* p< .001
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TABLE 1^
Degree To Which Subjects Perceived Their
Questions As Logical, With Shifting Class
And Time As Independent Variables
Time
Shifting Questionnaire Al Questionnaire B
Class
1 3.29 3.71
(5-10)
2 2.70 3.57
(11-15)
3 3.^1 4.41
(20)
Marginals:
Al 3.13*
B 3.90
SC 1 3.50
SC 2 3.13
SC 3 3.91
Note: The greater the number, the more illogical the questions.
* p< .001
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although SC 1 did differ from SC 2 on the first administration of
Questionnaire A (Al) at p < .10 (t = 1.71, 56df, two-tailed).
Figure 8 graphs mean amounts of money subjects in each class expected
to win by successfully identifying the first object. No comparisons across
classes were significant even at the .10 level. However, on Questionnaire
B, a significant difference (p < .01) was found between the gains sub-
jects in SC 1 and SC 3 believed they would experience by shifting to
the second object rather than continuing on with the first (Figure 9,
t = 3.53, 78df, two-tailed). Thus, Ss who shifted after the fifth and
before the tenth question thought they would win significantly more by
shifting than did those who did not shift at all. The direction of
this difference was the same at time Al, but only at the .10 level
(t = 1.73, 78df, two-tailed, SC 1 and SC 2 combined).
Each S_'s profit score was computed by subtracting the gain he expect-
ed to receive as a consequence of shifting from the gain he anticipated
receiving if he continued with the first object. Plotting mean profit
scores, as was done in Figure 10, revealed a significant difference be-
tween the combined means of SC 2 and 3, and SC 1 at Al (t = 2.09, 78df,
p < .05, two-tailed). In other words, relative to the average of the
other two groups, those shifting early in their questioning expected to
gain little by sticking with the first object. On Questionnaire B the
direction of these differences was the same, but not significant (p < .10
for the difference between SC 1 and SC 3, t = 1.95, 55df )
.
As for the degree of logic characterizing their questions, SC 3
felt, after asking twenty questions, that, on the average, their ques-
tions were significantly less logical than the mean of the other two
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groups (t = 2.19, 78df, p < .05, two-tailed). As can be seen in Figure
11, the direction of this difference prevailed from the very beginning:
those who never shifted during the course of their questioning tended to
feel that their first five questions were less logical than those shifting
after eleven to fifteen questions (t » 1.94, 43df, p < .10, two-tailed).
Insert Figures 7-11 about here
Visual inspection of Figures 7-11 suggests that shifting groups did
differ with respect to certain cognitive variables at time Al. For exam-
ple, early shifters (SC 1) reported lower probabilities of identifying
object one and anticipated less profit would accrue by persisting with
that object. And at time B, subjects who never shifted appear to feel
there was, in fact, less to be gained by shifting, and anticipated greater
absolute payoff from identifying object one than did those who had
shifted. But these visual impressions, and the t tests reported above,
cannot be construed to represent firm findings; the analyses of variance
failed to reveal significant main effects of shifting groups or signifi^
cant interactions of time and shifting groups. Perhaps larger ri's would
have permitted differences which are visually apparent and seemingly
logical to become statistically significant.
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Fig. 7. Mean subjective probabilities that S will
successfully identify first object as a
function of questionnaire administration
with shifting classification as a parameter.
(Note: the smaller the number, the greater
the subjective probability)
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Discussion
The manipulations of this study failed to have the anticipated
effects on subjects' persistence in asking questions concerning object
one. Whether the subject had seemingly chosen object one or had been
assigned to it did not affect persistence, nor did the retrievability of
the costs subjects had incurred. Moreover, although magnitude of incur-
red costs had a significant effect on commitment, results were opposite
to those predicted in that subjects losing ten cents for failing to
identify the initial object with their first five questions tended to ask
a greater number of total questions than did those experiencing the
sixty-cent loss. It is possible, of course, that the theory underlying
the predictions is wrong. But when a theory rather closely parallels
anecdotal evidence and everyday experience, disconfirmation may mean that
the theory has not been adequately tested.
It will be remembered from our shifting-class analysis that all sub-
jects, regardless of shifting classification, tended to share initial and
terminal cognitions (e.g., subjective probabilities, profit). Further,
since pre-shift changes in these cognitions were equal across such group-
ings of subjects, the major difference between shifting classes became
the number of questions required for such cognitive changes to occur.
For example, all subjects tended to share the same subjective probabilities
associated with successful identification of the first object, both
after asking their first five questions and after shift, post-shift
probabilities being significantly lower than those initially held.
The decrement in probability manifested by early shifters, although equal
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to that of the other two groups, occurred more rapidly than for subjects
who persisted in asking questions. Thus, the data suggest that shifting
occurred after a sufficiently low level of expectation had been reached,
a point at which some subjects arrived more quickly than others.
Relevant to the above discussion may be Steiner's concept of outcome
freedom. According to Steiner (1970) outcome freedom, in referring to
the degree to which a person perceives himself as able to obtain desira-
ble outcomes, varies directly with the expected gain associated with
outcome achievement. Expected gain equals outcome valence times the
subjective probability of outcome attainment, minus any cost incurred
during goal pursuit. Consequently, outcome freedom is held to be posi-
tively related to valence and subjective probability and negatively
related to costs incurred. However, these components of expected gain
need not be orthogonal. For example, in some situations, individuals
will invest prized resources during goal pursuit because such investment
is seen as instrumental to goal achievement. Under these conditions,
outcome freedom will increase in expenditure. On the other hand, in
some situations, investment and subjective probability of outcome
achievement are thought to be unrelated. Further expenditures, there-
fore, rather than increasing one's expected gain through subjective
probability increments, only serve to restrict outcome freedom. Thus,
when a perception of zero correlation between subjective probability and
investment exist, continued expenditure of prized resources may restrict
the outcome freedom associated with a particular goal to a level lower
than that associated with alternative outcomes. When such low levels
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of outcome freedom obtain, shifting to a more attractive alternative
should result.
Applying this line of reasoning to the shifting class analysis, it
seems plausible that shifting to the alternative object followed rela-
tively severe restrictions on perceived outcome freedom, restrictions
resulting from the perception of zero correlation between subjective
probability and incurred costs. In other words, shifting may have
occurred only after 1) individuals realized that their mounting costs
were no longer instrumental to the successful identification of object
one, and 2) when after continued failure, the outcome freedom associated
with object one decreased to a point lower than that associated with the
alternative object.
Assuming that shifting did indeed involve the two-step process just
described, the point at which a particular subject elected to shift may
have reflected his appraisal of his game-playing ability. To further
explain, the sooner the subject concluded that he was unable to play the
twenty questions game (i.e., was unable to ask the right questions at
the right time), the sooner he should have realized that costs no longer
insured eventual success. This realization should, in turn, have re-
sulted in decreasing subjective probability estimates, diminishing ex-
pected winnings associated with both objects one and two, and the lower
expected profits revealed by our shifting class analysis (Figures 7-10).
Thus, for example, high cost subjects may have attributed less game-play
ing ability to themselves after asking a few comparatively fruitless
questions than did those experiencing the smaller initial expenditure.
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Such self
-attributions, occurring relatively early for those losing sixty
cents, should have encouraged a realization that the correlation between
costs and subjective probability was essentially zero (large costs had
led to very little discernible progress). Such a realization should, in
turn, have led to low level of outcome freedom associated with object
one, and, consequently, to an earlier shift. However, it must be remem-
bered that the two cost groups reported the same cognitions in response
to Questionnaire Al. Consequently, the impact of the cost manipulation
probably did not occur immediately following the cost manipulation.
Put otherwise, only at some later point in the course of questioning did
the level of initial incurred costs differentially affect the time re-
quired for subjects to form beliefs about their inability to play the
twenty questions game.
To understand the delayed effect of costs upon shift, note that
responses to the first administration of Questionnaire A indicated that,
overall, subjects expected to win $1.43 upon successful identification
of the first object (see Table 11), a value remarkably similar to that
advertised in circulated sign-up flyers as the "average winnings" of
subjects, who, it was said, had already participated in this experiment.
(Average winnings were said to have been "about $1.50.") Volunteering
for experimental participation may have been a direct result of this
"come-on." Thus, our subjects, upon entering the experimental situation
with the prior (but false) knowledge of "average winnings," expected
similar "average" levels of financial success. Combined with the likely
assumption that subjects also believed that the conditions under which
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they ware playing the game were identical to those to which the
"typical subject" was exposed, it is not surprising that few system-
atic differences were found on subjects' initial cognitions. Thus,
regardless of any essentially irrelevant rules or regulations connected
with actual game-playing, pre
-experimental expectations regarding
eventual monetary reward established a goal toward which subjects con-
fidently believed themselves to be headed. (That a main effect for
retrievability was found on initial estimates of money associated with
successful identification of object two, and therefore, on profit, may
only reflect the fact that subjects understood the retrievability rule:
those for whom money was retrievable expected greater winnings in the
event it became desirable to shift than did those for whom costs were
forever lost. However, since both types of subjects expected to identi-
fy object one and to win approximately the amount that had been won by
the average subject, and since both types tended to shift at the same
point in their subsequent questioning, it seems probable that few sub-
jects felt that a shift would become desirable. Thus the retrievability
became irrelevant and ineffectual in affecting either initial perceptions
or shift.)
Expectation of "average winnings" possibly rendered the cost
manipulation initially irrelevant. However, exposure to repeated "no's"
may have led subjects to the belief that they were going up a blind
alley and that, therefore, the initially expected winnings would not be
forthcoming. Such a realization may, in turn, have forced subjects to
conclude that their ability to avoid blind alleys by initiating the
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correct line of questioning was somewhat less than that of the "typical
subject," who it was probably assumed, had identified the very object
with which our subjects were having so much difficulty (since the object
on which our subjects were working was perceived to be the easier of the
two). Thus, in failing to perform as well as the average subject was
thought to have performed, subjects may have concluded, in hindsight,
that they did not extract as much information from their first five
questions as was necessary to avoid blind alleys and eventual failure.
Hence, one's first five questions became, for essentially the first time,
a salient factor in subjects 1 re -evaluations of their heretofore complacent
performance.
In reinterpreting their past performance, subjects may have further
reasoned that the information potential of their (now perceived) crucial
questions was directly related to the price placed upon them. The more
expensive the question, the more information the question must potentially
contain. Moreover, inability to play the game may have been perceived
as directly reflected in the degree to which the assumed information
potential of one's initial questions was not actualized. Hence, following
the onset of continued failure, high cost subjects may have come to see
themselves as less able to play the game than did their low costs counter-
parts since the former experienced a greater discrepancy between infor-
mation thought to be potentially available.
Returning to the process by which investment affected commitment,
level of initial incurred costs may have belatedly affected shift by
correspondingly affecting the perceived discrepancy between information
acquired and information thought to be potentially available. This
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discrepancy may, in turn, have influenced the rapidity with which sub-
jects concluded they had little game-playing ability. Thus, high
initial losses, by implying large discrepancies between perceived
potential information and information actually gained, eventually
facilitated shift by favoring early attribution of low game-playing
ability. Small losses, on the other hand, having little negative bear-
ing on game-playing ability, delayed the development of such attributions
until after the occurrence of significantly more negative feedback.
Inspection of the significant sex by cost interaction on post-
shift expected winnings associated with successful identification of
the first object lends partial support to the above cost-effect interpre-
tation. This interpretation posits that cost affected commitment only
when subjects, in failing to meet their personal expectation of "average"
success, reinterpreted both the information potential of their initial
first five questions, and their game-playing ability. Figure 3 reveals
that costs had great effect on male expectations but little or no effect
on female estimates. These results are consonant with the previously
presented explanation since, due to the expectation of average success
associated with object one, initial losses incurred by males were not
seen as particularly reflective of failure or inability to achieve that
which the average subject was thought to have obtained. However,
triggered by the occurrence of unexpected continual failure, male sub-
jects may have begun to reinterpret the situation and, in so doing,
made inability self -attributions on the basis of the information potential
assumed to be associated with initial investment. Thus, at the time of
shift, high-cost male subjects, in relating high costs to low game-playing
55
ability, estimated lower winnings with the object from which they were
shifting than did low cost males who, due to the assumed low information
potential of their initial questions, had received less relevant infor-
ation. Females, on the other hand, their expectation of relatively
poor performance fulfilled, required no situational reanalysis, tended
not to reflect upon the relationships between cost, information potential,
and game-playing ability, and therefore were relatively unaffected by
the cost manipulation. (That no main effect, or sex by cost interaction,
was found on the amount of money associated with successful identifica-
tion of the second object, a prediction derivable from the assumption
that high and low cost males self -attributed different levels of game-
playing ability, may simply reflect subjects 1 beliefs that, due to the
relatively low number of remaining questions available for the identifi-
cation of the more difficult object, game-playing ability and success
were unrelated*)
The above explanation applies, of course, only if the assumption is
made that females, from the beginning, thought themselves to be relative-
ly unable to successfully play the twenty questions game. However, this
supposition is not without some empirical support in that the data re-
veal that females initially tended to expect less upon successful identi-
fication of either objects one or two (Questionnaire Al, Items 3 and 6,
p levels less than .10 and .05, respectively). (Although self -attribu-
tion of lower game-playing ability, assumed to be characteristic of fe-
males, did not result in their shifting earlier, this is not taken as a
contradiction of our present formulation. Low ability self -attributions
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probably produced lower expected gains associated with each object, but
did not affect the relative difference between the two outcome freedom
perceptions. Thus, although they perceived a relatively low level of
outcome freedom associated with each alternative, females required as
many questions as did males before the outcome freedom associated with
the first object fell to the point of shift.)
In summary, it is tentatively suggested that commitment in this
study was inversely related to the rapidity with which a two-step
process (involving the pecrceptions of zero subjective probability-costs
correlation and associated decrements in the perceived outcome freedom
related to the initial object) occurred. It is further suggested that
initial incurred costs, upon reanalysis, greatly affected the rate at
which this process was concluded.
It follows from our discussion that those factors which delay the
perception of zero subjective probability-costs correlation will also
favor commitment. For example, crucial to our initial theory was the
loss -of -face construct. Specifically, it was hypothesized that decision
freedom and the incurrence of high costs, by implying post-shift loss of
face, would result in the continuation of a costly course of action.
Hen/ever, our (albeit post hoc) analysis suggests that expected loss of
face is only one of several factors which sustain perceptions of positive
subjective probability- costs correlations (i.e., result in continued
expectation of success in the face of defeat) and is, for that reason,
commitment producing. Unfortunately, due to methodological difficulties,
this research failed adequately to manipulate either decision freedom or
the voluntary incurrence of high costs. It is unclear whether subjects
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actually felt they had less freedom of choice when "luck" determined
whether they began with the preferred object. Perhaps an experimenter
who honored their preferences was seen as no more responsive to their
choices than was luck which, as it turned out, also permitted them to
do as they pleased. As for the cost manipulation, level of initial loss
depended upon first giving Ss either a large or small sum of money and
then, in effect, taking away a large or small amount. Possibly subjects
did not regard the latter portion of the manipulation as a personal
cost since it was automatically imposed by E and was not at all under
the voluntary control of the subject. Thus, whether or not these
variables affect the perceived subjective probability-costs correlations
cannot here be answered.
As a final note, then, future research should employ more effective
manipulations of decision freedom and voluntary incurrence of high costs,
as well as attempt to minimize the countermanipulative effects of pre-
experimental expectations. In retrospect, for example, it seems that a
more appropriate technique for restricting decision freedom would involve
the experimenter commanding the subject to begin work on that object
which the subject "secretly" preferred. Allowing Ss to choose between
the identification of an easier object at high costs or that of a more
difficult object at low costs might also be a better operationalization
of voluntary cost incurrence. Hopefully such improvements in manipula-
tions will help to explicate the relationship of decision freedom,
incurred costs, and cost retrievability to both subjective probability-
costs correlation perceptions and commitment.
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Summary
Employing a modified version of the Twenty Questions game, 80 male
and female subjects attempted to identify either one of two objects, the
initial object being either freely chosen or randomly assigned (high and
low decision freedom, respectively). Subjects were supplied an initial
sum of money from which deductions were made as S continually failed to
identify his first object. Specifically, high cost Ss initially lost
sixty cents while the low cost subjects lost only ten cents, all subjects
being penalized equally thereafter. During their questioning, Ss could
opt to switch to the second object, such shifting resulting in either full
or zero recoupment of previous losses (high and low cost retrievability
,
respectively). Upon successful identification of either object, S be-
lieved he could retain that which remained in his fund. Commitment was
operationally defined as the number of questions asked about the first
object before shifting to the second. Although it was hypothesized that
high levels of both decision freedom and costs, as well as low levels of
cost retrievability , would favor commitment, only a main effect for costs,
opposite to prediction, was found. Lack of predicted findings was attri-
buted to poor operationalization of decision freedom and incurred costs,
as well as to subject pre-experimental expectation. Because further analy-
sis revealed that all subjects' perceptions of the situation tended to
change in the same manner (some subjects simply requiring more time to
experience these cognitive changes than others), it was tentatively hypo-
thesized that shift was preceded by significant decreases in outcome free-
dom following from the perceptions of zero subjective probability-costs
correlations. Factors which might affect perceived subjective probability-
costs correlations, and therefore commitment, were then discussed.
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Appendix A
Questionnaire A
We want to know your thoughts up to this point. Answer each questionby either placing a checkmark on the scale or by filling in the blanks
Please answer all questions
,
1. How difficult is it to think of questions regarding the identity of
the object?
Very
Very eas y : : : : : : : : difficult
2. From the information available to you so far, what do you think is
the likelihood that you will be able to identify the object about
which you have been asking questions?
Very
Very likely : : : : : : : : uniike iy
3. How much of your original fund (in dollars and cents) are you likely
to win if you continue asking questions about the object you started
on? Give as precise a value as possible.
$_
4. How logical has your line of questioning been so far?
Very
Very logical
: : : : s : : : illogical
5. At this point, how much do you feel about about continuing to ask
questions about the object you started on rather than shifting to
the other?
Strongly prefer
: : : : : : : : Strongly
to continue prefer to
shift
6. Bearing in mind that any costs you have incurred up to this point
will be sustained (cancelled) if you shift, how much of your original
fund (in dollars and cents) do you think you would win if you shifted
to the other object?
$
7. From the information available to you so far, do you think the
object about which you have been asking questions is the easier of
the two to identify?
Definitely
harder
Definitely
easier
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Appendix A (Con't)
How close to identifying an object do you think you are right now?
Not at all
Very close
:
: : : :
.
. . close
Of the two objects given, how was the particular object about which
you have been asking questions selected? (Check one of the follow-
ing.)
Of the two, I decided with which to begin.
Of the two, a random assignment dictated with which object I
would begin.
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Appendix B
Questionnaire B
Before beginning to ask questions about the other object, please give
us your thoughts about the way things have developed so far.
1. If you had not decided to shift, what do you think is the likelihood
that you would eventually have identified the first object?
Very
Very likely
:
: : s : :
.
. unlikely
2. If you had continued to ask questions about the first object, how
much of your original fund (in dollars and cents) would you have
won?
3. How logical was your line of questioning concerning the first
object?
Very
Very logical
: : : : : : : : illogical
4. Bearing in mind that any costs you have incurred up to this point
will be sustained (cancelled), how much of your original fund
(in dollars and cents) do you think you will win by identifying the
second object?
The following items concern reasons why you did not shift earlier.
Each item contains two alternatives. Please put a checkmark before
the one which comes closer to representing your reasons for not
shifting earlier.
A. Once I start something I like to finish it.
I thought I was working on the easier object.
B. The "no answers I had received would cost me too much money.
Having started on one object, a rapid shift might make me look
silly.
C. I had too much invested in the first object.
Even when it looks like I can't win I don't like to admit
failure.
D. It was hard for me to accept the fact I wasn't making good
progress
.
Shifting meant paying for "no" answers that wouldn't do me
any good.
I thought I'd make more money by sticking with the first
object.
I got personally involved in identifying the first object,
and didn't want to shift even though sticking with it might
cost me money.
Appendix C
Review Test
How will your earnings be determined?
If you ask a question after the first five that gets a "no"
answer, how much does the question cost you?
cents
•
How many questions must you ask about one of the objects before
you are free to shift to the other?
questions.
Explain why it is to your advantage to be logical in this
experiment.
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